Neoliberal and inclusive themes in European lifelong learning policy by Holford, John & Mohorčič Špolar, Vida A.
1 
 
DRAFT: not for citation. This is a pre-peer-review, pre-copy edited version of a chapter published in Sheila 
Riddell, Jörg Markowitsch, and Elisabet Weedon, eds., Lifelong learning in Europe: Equity and efficiency in the 
balance, Bristol: Policy Press (2012). Details of the definitive published version and how to purchase it are 
available online at:  
http://www.policypress.co.uk/display.asp?K=9781447300137&sf1=keyword&st1=riddell&m=1&dc=8  
 
Chapter 3 
Neoliberal and inclusive themes in European lifelong learning policy 
John Holford1 & Vida A. Mohorčič Špolar2  
 
When lifelong learning emerged as a key theme of educational policy in the 1990s, international 
organisations played a decisive role. Some, particularly the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and the United Nations’ Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO), had a ‘track record’: in the 1970s UNESCO had enthused about ‘lifelong education’ (Faure  
et al. 1973), the OECD about ‘recurrent education’ (OECD 1973). In contrast, the European Union 
had no such pedigree. Although the Council of Europe had advocated ‘permanent education’ as early 
as 1966 (Council of Europe 1970), the EU itself3 had been silent. Yet, as Field (2006) suggests, in the 
1990s the EU’s role was decisive.  
Since then, lifelong learning has developed from a policy concept popular among international 
organisations into a central feature in educational, welfare and labour market policies – and a key 
element in private and ‘third’ sector activity – across the ‘developed’ world. This chapter is 
concerned with the development and nature of the EU’s thinking on lifelong learning, with the part 
this plays in shaping public policy within member states, and with how the EU interacts with other 
‘actors’ in relation to lifelong learning.  
The core of the chapter is an historical account of the evolution of the EU’s thinking and practice on 
lifelong learning. We pursue this chiefly through the continuing tension between two policy themes: 
education (and training and learning) for productivity, efficiency and competitiveness on the one 
hand, and education for broader personal development and ‘social inclusion’ on the other. However, 
we begin by outlining three areas of debate within the academic literature. The historical account 
will, we believe, serve to illuminate these debates. 
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Areas of Debate 
Economic and Social Aims 
In a much-cited phrase, Boshier described lifelong learning as ‘human resource development in drag’ 
(1998, p. 4). His point was the contrast between the broad, humanistic approach of the Faure Report 
and the vocational character of the language used around lifelong learning in the 1990s. The broad 
thrust of his critique has been widely accepted. As Rizvi and Lingard argue, a ‘particular social 
imaginary of globalization, namely neoliberalism, has underpinned educational policy shifts around 
the world over the last two decades’ (2010, p. 184). They see this as linked to attempts to reshape 
the nature of the individual, quoting approvingly Rose’s argument that ‘a new set of educational 
obligations’ requires the citizen ‘to engage in a ceaseless work of training and retraining, skilling and 
reskilling …: life is to become a continuous economic capitalization of the self’ (Rose 1999, 161).  
Some (e.g., Edwards 2004, Edwards and Boreham 2002) have seen the European Union’s approach 
through a prism similar to Rose’s. The particular approach based on Foucault has been subjected to 
some theoretical critique (e.g., Holford 2006); nevertheless, a widespread consensus now exists that 
the European Union’s approach to lifelong learning is strongly vocational. As Field writes, lifelong 
learning is regarded in the European Commission ‘primarily as a source of competitive advantage’ 
(2006, p. 17; see also Ertl 2006, Dehmel 2006).  
The EU itself, however, has long stressed that lifelong learning has a range of non-economic 
justifications. Its 1995 white paper, for instance, set out five ‘general objectives’ designed ‘to put 
Europe on the road to the learning society’. These included not only closer links between schools 
and business, and encouraging investment in training, but combating exclusion and developing 
proficiency in three European languages. Lifelong learning was seen in a wider perspective: 
Education and training provide the reference points needed to affirm collective identity, 
while at the same time permitting further advances in science and technology. The 
independence they give, if shared by everyone, strengthens the sense of cohesion and 
anchors the feeling of belonging. Europe's cultural diversity, its long existence and the 
mobility between different cultures are invaluable assets for adapting to the new world on 
the horizon. (CEC 1995, p. 54) 
The white paper’s recommendations would  
help to show that the future of Europe and its place in the world depend on its ability to give 
as much room for the personal fulfilment of its citizens, men and women alike, as it has up 
to now given to economic and monetary issues. (CEC 1995, p. 54) 
Subsequent EU statements have continued to emphasise non-economic aims for lifelong learning. 
The Lisbon strategy set ‘a new strategic goal for the next decade [2001-2010]: to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world ... with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion’ (CEC 2000). A decade later the Council of the European Union asserted: 
Education and training systems contribute significantly to fostering social cohesion, active 
citizenship and personal fulfilment in European societies. They have the potential to 
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promote upward social mobility and to break the cycle of poverty, social disadvantage and 
exclusion. Their role could be further enhanced by adapting them to the diversity of citizens’ 
backgrounds in terms of cultural richness, existing knowledge and competences, and 
learning needs. (Council of the EU 11 May 2010 (2010/C 135/02): Official Journal of the 
European Union 26 May 2010) 
Jarring as this does with the academic consensus on the vocational and neoliberal nature of the EU’s 
aims in lifelong learning, the question arises: to what extent are non-economic themes – equity, 
social inclusion, social cohesion, citizenship, and so forth – genuine priorities in EU lifelong learning 
policy? 
Policy Processes and Spaces 
The second principal area of debate has been over the nature of policy-making in European lifelong 
learning. Although the European Union’s policy processes have for many years been a focus of 
research interest in areas such as Political Science and Social Policy, policy-making in education and 
lifelong learning has seldom been a focus. The fifth edition of the major Oxford University Press 
textbook on Policy Making in the European Union (Wallace, Wallace and Pollack 2005), for example 
has whole chapters on virtually every area of policy (social, agricultural, employment, biotechnology, 
fisheries, trade, foreign and security, etc.) – but mentioned education only in passing on one of its 
570 pages; the sixth edition (Wallace, Pollack and Young 2010) contains passing references to 
education on four of 597 pages. (Neither the learning society nor lifelong learning is mentioned at all 
in either edition.) In fact, however, European educational policy had become a focus of attention for 
a few educational researchers rather before this. Lawn has argued that the notion of a European 
educational ‘space’ – a favoured term in some areas of the European Commission – was not only 
rhetoric, but contained the germ of a new approach to educational governance. In particular, he has 
argued, it empowered a new range of actors through ‘soft governance’ by a ‘range of particular 
governing devices (networking, seminars, reviews, expert groups, etc)’ (Lawn 2006: 272). Lawn’s 
argument is that, in the EU, a ‘new space for education’ now exists within the dominant, market, 
discourse (Lawn 2002, p. 20). The space is ‘fluid, heterogeneous and polymorphic’, existing ‘within 
the daily work of teachers and policy-makers, within shared regulations and funded projects, within 
curriculum networks and pupil assignments, and in city collaborations and university pressure 
groups’. It represents, he argues, a significantly new approach to policy-making, involving the 
creation of a ‘new cultural space’ in which ‘new European meanings in education are constructed’ 
(p. 5) – though not that it necessarily leads to radically different agendas.  
A key question, therefore, is whether a new European space exists for education or lifelong learning 
in any meaningful sense – and to the extent that it does, what difference this makes. Lawn’s initial 
framing of the argument implied, even where it did not explicitly state, that within this new 
European educational space, concerns about equity and the social could be more effectively 
asserted – in contrast with the predominantly economic discourse in other educational policy circles. 
More recently, however, an alternative approach has been promoted, by a group of scholars who 
acknowledge the EU’s role in educational policy, and even accept the existence of an educational 
space, but question its nature, direction and significance. The principal statement of this position is 
Dale and Robertson (2009). The root of their argument is that Europeanisation – ‘“doing” and 
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“making” Europe’ (Dale 2009, p. 8) – should be seen principally as a subspecies of globalisation: that 
the EU ‘is involved in the construction of globalisation and that globalisation frames economic, 
political, cultural (etc.) possibilities for Europe’ (Dale 2009, p. 25). Globalisation, in their view, 
comprises considerably more than economic competition, but competitiveness is very much the 
‘master discourse’ (Dale 2009, p. 26).  
They do not see the European project, however, as reducible to globalisation – if that is construed as 
economic competition: ‘there is a distinct “Europe-centred” project whose aim is to “thicken” the 
discourses and institutions of Europe, irrespective of economic competition’ (Dale 2009, p. 27); the 
EU is unusual among international organisations ‘in having more than economic ambitions, and 
seeing its project spreading wider and deeper than short-term collective economic benefit’ (Dale 
2009, p. 28). So far, this seems to chime with Lawn’s view, and the idea of Europe as protector of 
social rights. But this is not what Dale and Robertson have in mind when they refer to ‘thickened’ 
European discourses and institutions. The Lisbon goals were not just about responding to global 
competition, they were about competing with specific competitors (the US, Japan and so forth). 
Educational strategies – the European Higher Education Area, the Bologna Process and related 
projects – are in their view ‘ambitious global strategies’ (Robertson 2009, p. 77). The Bologna 
Process is not simply a mechanism to achieve uniformity within Europe, but a model to transform 
higher education globally in the European image and the European interest. ‘While for a long time 
Europe has legitimated its activities by presenting itself as a civilising rather than imperialising 
presence, its  more explicit economic and transnational interests open it up to charges of modern-
day colonialism and imperialism’ (Robertson 2009, p. 78).  
The European Union and its Member States 
The formation of EU thinking on lifelong learning has coincided with the EU’s most substantial period 
of expansion. In 1994, when the white paper Growth, Competitiveness, Employment (CEC 1994) first 
thrust lifelong learning to the centre of European policy, the Maastricht Treaty was in the recent 
past; the EU comprised twelve member states with a population of 350 millions. By 2007 there were 
27 member states, and a population of over 500 millions. Many of the new member states had 
formerly been to the east of the ‘iron curtain’; the remainder were principally to the south; their 
political and economic histories were diverse, encompassing various forms of authoritarian and 
democratic governments, economic planning and markets. With a population of 38 millions, Poland 
was very much the largest; the remainder had populations below – many well below – 12 millions. 
Perhaps more important, 86 per cent of the EU’s GDP in 2010 was generated within the twelve 
countries which had entered the EU before 19954: the 25 per cent of the population who live within 
the ‘post-1995’ countries generate only 14 per cent of EU GDP. After 1995, therefore, EU institutions 
(and in particular the Commission) were grappling with major challenges of development and 
cohesion within an increasingly diverse polity.5 
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In this light, European lifelong learning policies appear as mechanisms not for the social and 
economic development of a stable geographical region (analogous to a national government’s 
formulating policy for its regions and local governments), but similar in many respects to the 
challenges facing the government of a nascent imperial power (cf Holford 2005). New populations 
and cultures must be incorporated; new colonial leaders (and their established political institutions) 
engaged with; a new imperial economy created – while at the same time the new polity and 
economy engage with the challenges of a turbulent external environment. The parallel is not, of 
course, exact: the EU’s member states have legal national sovereignty, and participate on a basis 
formally equivalent to other member states in the EU’s decision-making processes. It is, however, 
instructive. 
The work of Dale and Robertson relates to this. There is, they argue, a ‘hegemonic project’ of 
‘constructing Europe, economically, politically, culturally’. This involves, inter alia, an extensive 
project of reconstructing governance, and it is in this context that developments in European 
education policy are to be understood. ‘Europe’, in their view, is a willing collaborator in the 
processes of neoliberal globalisation. Neoliberal globalisation involves ‘harnessing the apparatuses 
of the state to its own purposes in place of the decommodifying and “market-taming” role the state 
had under social democracy’ (Dale 2009, p. 29). They see the EU not only as a location in which this 
process plays out, but as a mechanism by which nation-states within the EU are educated or 
disciplined to this end: the open method of co-ordination, fundamental to the Lisbon Process, for 
instance, enables the EU to intervene in and shape national policy agendas. According to this 
argument, therefore, the EU’s role in education is not defensive, a protective rampart for discourses 
of ‘equity’ and ‘social inclusion’, but a division of the neoliberal army. 
In relation to this, Dale distinguishes between a European education space and European education 
policy. The former, he says, is an ‘opportunity structure’ framed by treaties, policy frameworks and 
community history. The latter is comes not only of the Commission and its Directorates-General, but 
also from member states’ policies and preferences and from ‘existing conceptions of the nature and 
capacity of “education”’ (Dale 2009, p. 32). European education policy is not, therefore, concerned 
only with the national level: to understand the growing role of Europe in educational governance, 
we must, in Dale’s view, dispense with ‘methodologically nationalist and statist assumptions’ (Dale 
2009, p. 32). In this vein, Robertson argues that the ‘revamped Lisbon strategy’ has strengthened 
‘neo-liberal language of economic competitiveness’ in European higher education policies. Higher 
education, she suggests, is now ‘strategically important’ for the EU, playing a key part in ‘creating 
both “minds” and “markets” for the European knowledge-economy’ (Robertson 2008, p. 1). From 
this perspective, therefore, the EU is closely allied with the interests of private capital: the EU 
recruits markets in the interests of European business, while business recruits the EU in support of 
the extension of market opportunities both within the EU (for instance, by weakening the walls 
between public to private sector in education) and across the globe. 
 
Education and lifelong learning in the EU 
Education played a trivial role in the origins of the European Union. The EU began in the 1950s as the 
European Common Market; it had a subsequent incarnation as the European Economic Community. 
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Its founding treaties and fundamental institutions placed discourses of markets and economic 
competitiveness at its heart. Discussion of education was ‘taboo’ in European-level debates until the 
early 1970s – with very minor exceptions (Blitz 2003, p. 4). The 1970s saw only a few educational 
toes dipped in the policy pond: in 1971 Education Ministers agreed a non-binding resolution ‘to 
provide the population as a whole with the opportunities for general education, vocational training 
and life-long learning’ (Blitz 2003, 5); in 1974 – influenced by the first enlargement ministers 
encouraged ‘co-operation’ in various priority sectors, while preserving ‘the originality of educational 
traditions and policies in each country’ (CEC 1979, 2). 
The themes of co-operation and diversity enabled the Commission to advance, albeit slowly, on 
educational policy, largely avoiding conflict with member states. During the 1970s EU policy tended 
to confuse – perhaps deliberately – education as a universal value with the economic requirements 
of the single market. However, neither Commission nor Community put much emphasis on lifelong 
learning at that stage, in the adult or post-compulsory sense,6 perhaps because the Common 
Market’s economic focus was so distant from the strongly humanistic framing of lifelong education 
at that time (cf Faure et al. 1972). During the 1980s development remained incremental. Two 
features stand out: European Court of Justice decisions which permitted the Community to develop 
its educational role, and the establishment within the Commission of a de facto directorate 
responsible for education.7 However, the focus continued to be narrow – chiefly in support of 
improved school curricula and quality, and on European content. Concern with lifelong learning (in 
the post-compulsory sense) remained limited.8  
As we have seen, when lifelong learning re-emerged in national and international policies in the 
1990s, the emphasis was firmly on supporting economic performance, whether individual or societal 
(Boshier 1998; Field 2006). Arguably, however, within the EU this provided space for expansion of 
non-economically-oriented policies: the form which the renewed lifelong learning agenda took was 
much closer to the EU’s mainstream concerns. At the same time, until 1992 the Community’s legal 
‘competence’ in education was restricted; and the principle of subsidiarity meant most educational 
activities were organised and governed by member states. Any EU attempt to intervene in national 
educational affairs had to be closely related to its core aims, as expressed in the founding treaties: 
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notion of lifelong education as formulated in the early 1970s (Faure 1972) ‘almost disappeared’ from policy 
agendas (Dehmel 2006, 51). Lee, Thayer and Madyun (2008), however, argue that although scholarly debates 
on lifelong learning diminished during the 1980s, within international policy communities ‘international 
discourse on lifelong learning was still ongoing during this period, albeit in a new neoliberal context’, and that 
this was ‘an important formative period out of which emerged a neo-liberal discourse on lifelong learning’ (p. 
448). 
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this meant educational measures had to be specifically justifiable as furthering the common market. 
Vocational education clearly fitted this aim; but wider desires to create a ‘people’s Europe’ had to be 
‘subservient to economic concerns’ (Blitz 2003, 9). Action programmes in the 1980s, such as 
‘Erasmus’, were therefore based on the need to strengthen the Community’s economic position.  
Maastricht gave the EU clear, if limited, ‘competence’ in education: to make ‘a contribution to 
education and training of quality and to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States’ (Treaty 
of Maastricht, Article G). This general aim was also subject to the principle of subsidiarity. A number 
of specific Community aims were also set out (chiefly relating to initial education), such as 
developing a ‘European dimension’ in education by strengthening language teaching, encouraging 
student and teacher mobility and recognition of qualifications, ‘promoting cooperation between 
educational establishments’, exchanging ‘information and experience’ on common educational 
issues, and encouraging youth exchanges, ‘exchanges of socio- educational instructors’, and distance 
education. (Article G).  
Maastricht did, however, explicitly address lifelong (qua post-school or post-initial) education – to a 
limited degree, and with a clear emphasis on the economic. The Community was to ‘implement a 
vocational training policy’ which should:  
facilitate adaptation to industrial changes, in particular through vocational training and 
retraining; improve initial and continuing vocational training in order to facilitate vocational 
integration and reintegration into the labour market; facilitate access to vocational training 
and encourage mobility of instructors and trainees and particularly young people; stimulate 
cooperation on training between educational or training establishments and firms; develop 
exchanges of information and experience on issues common to the training systems of the 
Member States. (Article G) 
From an educational policy perspective Maastricht was both modest and significant. It provided 
general authority for the EU (and its Commission) to contribute to ‘education and training of quality’, 
authorising policy development in areas not specifically itemised – although this general authority 
was circumscribed by the general principle of subsidiarity. Following Maastricht, therefore, those 
who sought to develop lifelong learning policy were newly empowered: member states could not 
object on principle to Commission activity in education. However, clear boundaries were set to 
activity: initial education or schooling was to the fore, as was the ‘European’ dimension; and insofar 
as post-school learning was specified, the focus was vocational.   
Given the legal framework, when lifelong learning re-emerged in the early 1990s, the Directorate-
General for Education developed policy chiefly in support of economic needs. Growth, 
Competitiveness, Employment (CEC 1994) emphasised globalisation, information and communication 
technology, and competition from Asia and the USA. The unemployment which would arise if Europe 
did not achieve and maintain economic growth and competitiveness was also a concern: learning 
was essential throughout life. Based on the competitiveness white paper, lifelong learning was now 
central to EU policy (and entirely consistent with the educational objectives of the Maastricht 
Treaty). The education White Paper, Teaching and Learning: Towards a Learning Society (1995) 
elaborated within this framework, and played a ‘crucial role in establishing lifelong learning as a 
guiding strategy in EU policies’ (Dehmel 2006, p. 53).  
8 
 
From the mid-1990s, the ‘primarily utilitarian, economic objectives’ which brought lifelong learning 
to centre-stage in international policy debates began to be complemented by ‘more integrated 
policies’ involving ‘social and cultural objectives’ (Dehmel 2006, p. 52). In the Socrates and Leonardo 
da Vinci programmes, for example, lifelong learning was a strong theme; 1996 was designated the 
European Year of Lifelong Learning. An implicit theme was building European identity and European 
citizenship.  
The Lisbon Strategy 
Adopting the language of Rizvi and Lingard, the Lisbon Strategy, launched in 2000, was predicated on 
‘imaginaries’ of neoliberal globalisation and the knowledge economy. The EU set itself ‘a new 
strategic goal for the next decade: to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth …’.  It was not, however, simply 
about the economy and competition: innovation, competition and growth were to deliver ‘more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion’ (CEC 2000).  This aim included ‘modernising’ the European 
social model and building an ‘active welfare state’.  
So far as education and training was concerned, this meant Europe’s systems must ‘adapt both to 
the demands of the knowledge society and to the need for an improved level and quality of 
employment’. Within this, adults were given a central role: in particular, ‘unemployed adults’ and 
employed people ‘at risk of seeing their skills overtaken by rapid change’ (CEC 2000). Other 
objectives, such as increased ‘investment in human resources’, a European lifelong learning 
framework for IT skills, foreign languages, entrepreneurship, social skills and the like, better 
mechanisms for student, teacher and researcher mobility, and greater transparency and recognition 
of qualifications, were also very much in the spirit of Maastricht (CEC 2000).  
The Lisbon Strategy also brought a key change in policy: the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC), a 
product of employment policy in the 1990s (Hantrais 2007), was applied in education. Subsidiarity 
remained important, but the OMC emphasised agreed timetables and goals, indicators and 
benchmarks, ‘monitoring, evaluation and peer review’ (CEC 2000). This meant – despite subsidiarity 
– increased intervention by the EU in member states. By ‘setting specific targets and adopting 
measures’, European guidelines would be ‘translated’ into national and regional policies and 
supported by the ‘mutual learning processes’ of monitoring, evaluation and peer review (CEC 2000). 
As part of the Lisbon process, as we shall see, the volume and detail of education and lifelong 
learning policy has increased markedly, and formulating and elaborating ‘benchmarks’ and 
‘indicators’ to measure progress in lifelong learning (and education and training) consistently across 
member states has become a major Commission activity.  
Lisbon in Crisis 
By 2003 it was clear that the EU would fall short of the Lisbon goals. This was clear in education: all 
European countries were making ‘efforts’ to adapt their education and training systems to ‘the 
knowledge-driven society and economy’, but the reforms were clearly insufficient and the pace of 
change too slow to enable the EU to attain the Lisbon objectives (CEC 2003, p. 3). But education’s 
problems were part of a wider malaise. A High Level Group, appointed in 2004 jointly by the 
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European Commission and Council (and chaired by Wim Kok), suggested that Europe’s ‘growth gap 
with North America and Asia’ had widened (High Level Group 2004, p. 6): 
if we are to deliver the Lisbon goals of growth and employment then we must all take action. 
To achieve them ... means more delivery from the European institutions and Member States 
through greater political commitment, broader and deeper engagement of Europe’s citizens, 
and a recognition that by working together Europe’s nations benefit all their citizens. 
In Robertson’s view, Kok helped construct a ‘crisis discourse’ and, from around 2005, to the EU’s 
forming 
a set of globally-oriented ‘education’ policies and programmes shaped by a new set of ideas 
about the production of a European knowledge economy. Together, these policies and 
programmes mark a significant shift away from a social market/‘fortress Europe’ as the 
means to create a knowledge-based economy toward a newer vision; a more open, globally-
oriented, freer market Europe. 
Neoliberal though its ‘imaginary’ may have been, the Kok report retained some ‘social Europe’ 
rhetoric. It was ‘sustaining Europe’s social model’ which required ‘higher growth and increased 
employment’, and ‘far more emphasis ... on involving European social partners and engaging 
Europe’s citizens’ (High Level Group 2004, p. 7). The emphasis on ‘delivery from the European 
institutions and Member States’ (p. 6) remained – so the OMC and indicators continued to be 
central. Quantitative measurement of outcomes against targets has therefore strengthened.  
Indicators and politics 
From around 2004 – roughly coincident with the Kok report –regular measurement and reporting of 
progress against Lisbon benchmarks began. Probably this has privileged economically-related 
outcomes: by and large, indicators related to vocational learning and participation are better 
developed than those related to ‘softer’ aims. However, although measurement tends to privilege 
the economic, it is not the end of the matter. Within the Commission, and more broadly within the 
European ‘educational space’, there have been political processes as well as political outcomes. As 
early as 2001, very shortly after Lisbon, elements within DG-EAC took advantage of the OMC to 
establish objectives for European education and training. In an important paper, a key Commission 
civil servant argued that Lisbon’s call for Ministers of Education to ‘undertake a general reflection on 
the concrete future objectives of education systems, focusing on common concerns and priorities 
while respecting national diversity’ (Council of the EU 2001, p. 4) in the light of the Lisbon goals was 
‘revolutionary’ (Hingel 2001, p. 15). This gave the EU a  ‘mandate to develop a “common interest 
approach” in education going beyond national diversities’ increasing ‘the European dimension of 
national educational policies’ and extending the ‘community dimension to education policy co-
operation between the Member States’. Mechanisms to measure progress and ensure compliance 
could only be based on a high degree of consensus in the setting of objectives and targets.  
This led to a set of ‘concrete future objectives of education and training systems’ being adopted by 
the EU Council in 2001. These covered improving education and training for teachers and trainers, 
developing skills for the knowledge society, increasing the recruitment to scientific and technical 
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studies, making the best use of resources, open learning environment, making learning attractive, 
improving foreign language learning, and increasing mobility and exchange. In 2002, DG-EAC set up a 
Standing Group on Indicators and Benchmarks (SGIB). This issued a ‘final list of indicators’ for 
education and training in July 2003: 29 were proposed, spread across the eight Lisbon objectives (an 
average of 3.6 per objective; one objective had a single indicator, one had six) (CEC DG-EAC 2003a). 
Identifying and developing indicators proved both technically and politically challenging. In 2004, 
Council and Commission emphasised ‘the need to improve the quality and comparability of existing 
indicators’. A ‘lack of relevant and comparable data’ caused difficulties (Council of the EU 2004). 
Gradually, however, a range of indicators was established. Those for ‘increasing mobility and 
exchange’ are typical: 
 Inward and outward mobility of teachers and trainers within the Socrates (Erasmus, 
Comenius, Lingua and Grundtvig) and Leonardo da Vinci programmes; 
 Inward and outward mobility of Erasmus students and Leonardo da Vinci trainees; 
 Foreign students enrolled in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6) as a percentage of all 
students enrolled in the country of destination, by nationality (European country or other 
countries); 
 Percentage of students (ISCED 5-6) of the country of origin enrolled abroad (in a European 
country or other countries). (DG-EAC 2003a). 
 
Neither Kok nor the ‘crisis of Lisbon’ brought an end to political struggles within the European 
educational space. Holford (2008) has shown how ‘policy actors’ took advantage of the Open 
Method of Co-ordination, attempting to ensure that citizenship remained on the EU’s policy agenda. 
Key policy documents in lifelong learning in the years after Kok continued to give emphasis to 
discourses of equity. Efficiency and Equity in European Education and Training Systems (CEC 2006a) 
argued that in vocational education and training the less well-qualified ‘are least likely to participate 
in further learning and so to improve their employment prospects’ (p. 9). Courses for ‘the 
unemployed and those who have not succeeded in the compulsory education system’ were 
therefore seen as ‘important’ in ‘equity terms’. Adult Learning: It is never too late to learn (CEC 
2006b) addressed the increasingly diverse range of member states, stressing that to achieve the 
Lisbon benchmarks four million additional adults would have to participate in lifelong learning. It 
posed adult learning as relevant not only to competitiveness, but also to demographic change 
(ageing and migration), and social inclusion. Barriers to participation had to be lowered; member 
states were called upon to invest in improved quality of provision, including for older people and 
migrants; ‘validation and recognition of non-formal and informal learning’ (within the European 
Qualifications Framework) and data for indicators and benchmarks should be improved. Key 
Competences for Lifelong Learning: European Reference Framework (CEC 2007), a technical 
document designed to ‘provide a European-level reference tool for policy-makers, education 
providers, employers, and learners themselves to facilitate national- and European-level efforts 
towards commonly agreed objectives’ (p. 3), specified knowledge, skills and attitudes across eight 
areas: communication in mother tongue and foreign languages, mathematical and digital 
competence, learning to learn and sense of initiative and entrepreneurship, social and civic 
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competences and cultural awareness and expression. Not all of these are transparently elements of 
a ‘neoliberal imaginary’ of competitiveness and globalisation.  
And indeed, more evidence of sustained efforts to bolster non-economic purposes in lifelong 
learning is to be found in the Council of the European Union’s 2010 Conclusions ‘on the social 
dimension of education and training’. This began by rehearsing eleven policy statements (decisions 
of the EU Council, the European Parliament, and EU government representatives), beginning with 
the Council conclusions on ‘equity and efficiency in education and training’ in November 2006, which 
in various ways emphasised the social importance of education and training. It gave ‘particular 
regard’ to: 
The Council conclusions of 12 May 2009 on a strategic framework for European cooperation 
in education and training (ET 2020) , which identified the promotion of equity, social 
cohesion and active citizenship as one of its four strategic objectives and which defined five 
reference levels of European average performance (European benchmarks) that also place a 
strong emphasis on achieving equity. (OJEU 26 May 2010, C135/2) 
In the context of the intensifying economic crisis, restating existing policies is not without value. But 
the 2010 Council Conclusions on the education’s social dimension did not do this alone. It made a 
number of statements of principle. For instance: 
Education and training systems contribute significantly to fostering social cohesion, active 
citizenship and personal fulfilment in European societies. They have the potential to 
promote upward social mobility and to break the cycle of poverty, social disadvantage and 
exclusion. Their role could be further enhanced by adapting them to the diversity of citizens’ 
backgrounds in terms of cultural richness, existing knowledge and competences, and 
learning needs. (OJEU 26 May 2010, C135/2) 
And: 
As the social effects of the economic crisis continue to unfold — and in the context of the 
European Year for Combating Poverty and Social Exclusion (2010) ( 12 ) — it is clear that the 
downturn has hit hard the most disadvantaged, while at the same time jeopardising 
budgetary efforts which target these groups. (OJEU 26 May 2010, C135/2) 
In addition, it made various recommendations, some of which have specific application in relation to 
adult learning. ‘Expanding access to adult education,’ it asserted, ‘can create new possibilities for 
active inclusion and enhanced social participation, especially for the low-skilled, the unemployed, 
adults with special needs, the elderly, and migrants’ (OJEU 26 May 2010, C135/2).  Inter-
generational learning was ‘a means of sharing knowledge and expertise, and of encouraging 
communication and solidarity between … generations, bridging the growing digital divide and 
reducing social isolation’ (OJEU 26 May 2010, C135/2).  It called on (‘invited’) member states to 
widen access to higher education, and to promote ‘specific programmes for adult students and other 
non-traditional learners’ within the HE sector (OJEU 26 May 2010, C135/2).  In relation to adult 
education, it called on them to: 
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Strengthen policies to enable the low-skilled, unemployed adults and, where appropriate, 
citizens with a migrant background to gain a qualification or take their skills a step further 
(one step up), and broaden the provision of second chance education for young adults.  
(OJEU 26 May 2010, C135/2) 
It argued for ‘collection of data on outcomes, drop-out rates and on learners’ socio-economic 
backgrounds, particularly in vocational education and training, higher education and adult 
education’ (OJEU 26 May 2010, C135/2). And it ‘invited’ member states and the Commission to: 
Pursue cooperation on the strategic priority of promoting equity, social cohesion and active 
citizenship, by actively using the open method of coordination within the context of the 
strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training (ET 2020) and by 
implementing the social dimension of the Bologna and Copenhagen processes and adopting 
measures in line with the 2008 Council conclusions on adult learning. (OJEU 26 May 2010, 
C135/2). 
These excerpts give only a flavour of the Council Conclusions ‘on the social dimension of education 
and training’. They range over all levels of education, seeking to ‘promote the role of education and 
training as key instruments for the achievement of the objectives of the social inclusion and social 
protection process’. (OJEU 26 May 2010, C135/2). They are testament to the continuing presence, 
within the European educational space, of influential political actors, and of their effectiveness in 
sustaining discourses of social purpose.  
Lifelong learning in ‘Europe 2020’ 
Education is, of course, only one aspect of the EU’s policy concern. If the Kok report spoke to (and 
about) a ‘crisis’ of the Lisbon strategy, the years since 2008 have seen a far more profound and 
general economic and political crisis in Europe. In the words of Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth, 
The recent economic crisis has no precedent in our generation. The steady gains in economic 
growth and job creation witnessed over the last decade have been wiped out – our GDP fell 
by 4% in 2009, our industrial production dropped back to the levels of the 1990s and 23 
million people - or 10% of our active population - are now unemployed. The crisis has been a 
huge shock for millions of citizens and it has exposed some fundamental weaknesses of our 
economy. (CEC 2010, p. 5) 
The economic crisis coincided with the closing years of the Lisbon strategy; at a technical level, 
therefore we see in the EU’s responses both the impact of immediate pressures and the outcomes of 
evaluation of the Lisbon years. The heart of the Commission’s proposed solution to the 
unprecedented crisis was ‘growth’:  
 Smart growth – developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation. 
 Sustainable growth – promoting a more resource efficient, greener and more competitive 
economy. 
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 Inclusive growth – fostering a high-employment economy delivering economic, social and 
territorial cohesion. (CEC 2010, p. 8) 
Education and training were to play a part in achieving this; but it was far from the leading role. 
Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth focusses on strategies for the 
financial sector, for competition and innovation, for investment, employment and the single market. 
At its heart are six ‘flagship initiatives’. In terms of specific aims for education, it repeated well-
established prescriptions. The Commission should  
give a strong impetus to the strategic framework for cooperation in education and training 
involving all stakeholders. This should notably result in the implementation of life-long 
learning principles (in cooperation with Member States, social partners, experts) including 
through flexible learning pathways between different education and training sectors and 
levels and by reinforcing the attractiveness of vocational education and training (CEC 2010, 
p. 17), 
while member states were encouraged to work hard to establish national qualifications frameworks 
(linked to the European Qualifications Framework), and to ensure more widespread acquisition and 
recognition of ‘the competences required to engage in further learning and the labour market’ (CEC 
2010, p. 17) . Not surprisingly, in a document focussing on economic crisis and growth, the emphasis 
is firmly on skills and vocational learning.  
There is, however, a further – and vital – dimension to Europe 2020: ‘stronger governance’ – but in 
very much the spirit of the Lisbon strategy. To achieve the ‘transformational change’ required in the 
EU’s economy, Europe 2020 would need ‘more focus, clear goals and transparent benchmarks for 
assessing progress’ (CEC 2010, p. 25). Indicators and benchmarks would still be central, but there 
would be a ‘thematic approach’, focussing ‘in particular’ on the delivery of five ‘headline targets’ (p. 
25). This would be accompanied by ‘country reporting’: this was described chiefly in economic terms 
(‘helping Member States define and implement exit strategies, to restore macroeconomic stability, 
identify national bottlenecks and return their economies to sustainable growth and public finances’ 
(p. 25)), but it clearly represented a shift in policy development and implementation methodology 
toward greater focus and integration.  
This more focussed approach would seem to imply that the emphasis on skills and vocational 
training would be carried through more centrally across EU lifelong learning policy. There is some 
evidence of this in the first major education policy statement made in the light of Europe 2020, 
‘Council [of the EU] conclusions on the role of education and training in the implementation of the 
“Europe 2020” strategy’ (OJEU 2011/C 70/01, 4 March 2011). This began by 
UNDERLINING [sic] its full readiness to put the Council's expertise on education and training 
policies at the service of the European Council and actively to contribute to the successful 
implementation of the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy for jobs and growth and the European 
Semester[9] …. (OJEU 2011/C 70/01, 4 March 2011) 
                                                          
9
 ‘The so-called European semester is one of the first initiatives to emerge from a task force on economic 
governance set up at the request of the European Council in March [2010] and chaired by the President of the 
14 
 
It proceeded to make a number of rather predictable assertions: education and training, and 
especially vocational education and training, had a ‘fundamental role’ in ‘achieving the “Europe 
2020” objectives of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’; the Council was committed to ensuring 
that ‘issues such as policy measures and reforms in the field of education and training, their 
contribution to the European targets and the exchange of good policy and practice are fully 
addressed’. Education and training had ‘special relevance’ to the ‘flagship initiatives’ (particularly 
‘youth on the move’ and ‘agenda for new skills and jobs’). But among these confessions of loyalty to 
the new régime, we find reassertions, perhaps sotto voce, of long-held commitments. Thus there 
was a reference to – though no quotation of – ‘the “ET 2020” framework and its four strategic 
objectives’, which continued to ‘constitute a solid foundation for European cooperation in the field 
of education and training’, and could ‘thus make a significant contribution towards achieving the 
“Europe 2020” objectives’ (OJEU 2011/C 70/01, 4 March 2011). One of the four strategic objectives 
was, of course, ‘Promoting equity, social cohesion and active citizenship’ (OJEU 2009/C 119/02, 28 
May 2009). And within the parameters of Europe 2020 concerns, we find such concerns stated: ‘the 
situation of young women and young men who face exceptional difficulties in entering the labour 
market due to the severity of the crisis’ should be addressed ‘as a matter of urgency’; education and 
training systems must provide ‘the right mix of skills and competences … to promote sustainable 
development and active citizenship’; strengthening ‘lifelong learning opportunities for all and at 
every level of education and training is essential, notably by improving the attractiveness and 
relevance of VET and by increasing the participation in, and the relevance of, adult learning’ (OJEU 
2011/C 70/01, 4 March 2011).  
Efforts to maintain an ‘inclusion’ theme within the new Europe 2020 order seem clear; and some 
success in this, albeit partial, should be acknowledged. However, the neoliberal, ‘competitiveness’, 
agenda dominates, and appears to be reinforced by the new OMC ‘architecture’. In particular, the 
‘Council conclusions on the role of education and training in the implementation of the “Europe 
2020” strategy’ focus attention not on the Lisbon benchmarks, though these remain, but on 
‘increased efforts … to achieve 
the two EU headline targets in education and training — i.e. reducing the share of early 
school leavers to less than 10 %, and increasing the proportion of 30-34 year olds having 
completed tertiary or equivalent education to at least 40 % — [which] will have a positive 
effect on jobs and growth. Moreover, measures taken in the education and training sector 
will contribute to achieving the targets in other areas, such as increasing employment rates, 
promoting research and development, and reducing poverty. (OJEU 2011/C 70/01, 4 March 
2011) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
European Council, Herman Van Rompuy. The aim is to boost coordination of the member states' economic 
policies on the basis of expected results. … The new six-month cycle will start each year in March when, on the 
basis of a report from the Commission, the European Council will identify the main economic challenges and 
give strategic advice on policies. Taking this advice into account, in April the member states will review their 
medium-term budgetary strategies and at the same time draw up national reform programmes setting out the 
action they will undertake in areas such as employment and social inclusion. In June and July, the European 
Council and the Council will provide policy advice before the member states finalise their budgets for the 
following year.’ (Council of the EU 2010b) 
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The new focus on ‘headline targets’ is now clear. To this end (at least principally), members states 
are encouraged to adopt ‘National Reform Programmes (NRPs) which are targeted and action-based, 
and which will contribute to achieving the objectives of the “Europe 2020” strategy, including the EU 
headline targets’, and to take ‘policy actions in line with national targets’ (OJEU 2011/C 70/01, 4 
March 2011). The Commission, in turn, is asked to 
Further strengthen — in full agreement with the Member States — links between the 
implementation arrangements for the ‘ET 2020’ strategic framework and those for the 
‘Europe 2020’ Strategy, notably as regards work cycles, reporting and objective setting. 
Particular account should be taken of the headline targets and of appropriate measures 
taken under the ‘Youth on the Move’ and ‘Agenda for New Skills and Jobs’ initiatives, when 
proposing the mid-term priorities for the next cycle of ‘ET 2020’. (OJEU 2011/C 70/01, 4 
March 2011) 
Various other policy-co-ordination measures are proposed. On the whole, these are focussed on the 
Europe 2020 targets. However, even here some space is retained. For example, ‘as the basis for an 
exchange of views in Council in the course of each European Semester’ the Commission is to provide 
‘a thorough analysis of the progress made’ not only ‘towards the headline targets’, but also toward 
‘the “ET 2020” benchmarks’ (OJEU 2011/C 70/01, 4 March 2011)) – that is, towards the broader 
range of targets developed for education and training, which encompass non-economic objectives. 
The extent to which ‘neoliberal’ and ‘inclusive’ purposes will be reflected in the practice of Europe 
2020 remains to be seen – though a renewed emphasis on the former seems likely. There remains 
clear evidence of efforts, within the European educational space, to sustain citizenship and social 
cohesion concerns. However, EU education policy has always been principally vocational – to a large 
degree because competition and the free market were central to its founding treaties.  
Conclusion: Europe’s educational policy and the contours of its educational space 
During the 1960s and 1970s, many on the British Left regarded the (then) European Common 
Market) as a ‘capitalist club’. To join would ‘prevent a Labour government delivering a Socialist 
manifesto’ (Forster 2002, p. 135); ‘public ownership’, Tony Benn believed, ‘is ruled out by the Rome 
Treaty’ (quoted Mullan 2005, p. 129).  Though such attitudes now seem dated – ‘social Europe’ 
proved decidedly preferable to unfettered ‘Thatcherism’ – the European Union has deeply capitalist 
roots. It is a truism, but an important one, that the single market has set the boundaries for 
European educational policy since the 1950s. A more ‘inclusive’ agenda – equity, social inclusion and 
cohesion, active citizenship – was progressively developed during the 1980s and 1990s, allied with 
the pursuit of the ‘European ideal’;  they have been defended since with some success; but they 
have always operated within parameters set by the centrality of the single market in the EU’s 
founding treaties.  
At this point, we can usefully return to Dale’s (2009) distinction between a European education 
space (the opportunity structure framed by treaties, policy frameworks, history, etc.) and European 
education policy (the policies of the EU and its member states). From this perspective, in order to 
understand the direction of educational development in Europe, we should consider not only the 
policies of the EU, but also those of member states. But we also need to attend to changing nature 
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of the educational space itself: to the actors within it; the ideological frameworks within which they 
operate, and on which they draw; and their relative capacity to exercise power – whether economic, 
political or normative. In this sense, the educational space in Europe has changed significantly over 
the decade of the Lisbon Strategy. In particular, it has been opened to a wider range of actors drawn 
from the private sector, and often from substantial international corporations; it has seen a 
significant expansion of the role of the market in the provision of education and related services; it 
has seen an erosion of discourses of education, and a strengthening of language related to learning 
and training; we see the growth of qualifications frameworks, indicators, benchmarks and so forth. 
While some of these changes may appear technical, there seems little doubt that they are generally 
biased in favour of neoliberal, rather than inclusive, approaches. 
Robertson explores this in relation to higher education and public-private partnerships. The impact 
of Europe 2020 seems likely to strengthen the neoliberalisation of the European education space. 
Europe 2020 calls for ‘well functioning and well-connected markets where competition and 
consumer access stimulate growth and innovation’ and an ‘open single market for services’ (CEC 
2010a, p. 19). This seems likely to further encourage the breaking down of ‘barriers’ to the 
involvement of private corporations in educational provision and services. Arguably we can see the 
impact of this already in the Council ‘conclusions on the role of education and training in the 
implementation of the “Europe 2020” strategy’: for example, member states are encouraged to 
promote ‘reinforced cooperation between higher education institutions, research institutes and 
enterprises’, while there is a general call for incentives ‘to establish … partnerships with businesses 
and research’ (OJEU 2011/C 70/01, 4 March 2011). But this is no more than arguable: with respect to 
its ‘competitive’ language, this key education policy document is little different from the EU 
mainstream.  
The invasion of education by private sector actors is a world-wide phenomenon. What sets Europe 
apart within this global trend is the architecture of EU governance and policy-making: partly how this 
architecture mediates between global pressures and the activities of national governments (to both 
inclusive and neoliberal ends); partly the number and range of actors involved in educational 
processes (and the diversity of their cultural and institutional experiences); partly the sheer 
multiplicity of national and sub-national governments engaged in educational policy formation and 
implementation both within their own borders and at a EU level. This does not make the EU exempt 
from the forces of neoliberal globalisation; as Dale, Robertson and others have argued, in some 
respects the EU is actively complicit in furthering them. But the EU’s impact on European education 
is to be measured not only by advocacy of neoliberalism. The EU is also both a vast organisation and 
a major institution, ‘the most successful example of institutionalised international policy co-
ordination in the modern world’ developed through ‘a series of celebrated intergovernmental 
bargains’ (Moravcsik 1993, p. 473). Institutions and organisations demand sociological analysis. In 
the work of Dale and Robertson, we see the value of one such perspective: Marxism’s emphasis on 
relations of domination. But the sociology of organisation and bureaucracy is not written in the 
language of Marx alone. Weber’s emphasis on the dynamics of conflict and ‘party’ within 
organisations and on the informal as well as the formal and (as Jenson & Mérand 2010 argue) 
Durkheim’s exploration of ‘the links between social practices, symbolic representations and 
institutional forms, and the methods for analysing them that his students developed through 
ethnography’ (p. 75) are also important:  
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just as greater attention to social relations of power can enrich the analysis of the EU’s 
institutional development, the study of social practices draws a more compelling picture of 
how symbolic representations, norms and ideas are instantiated in European dynamics, and 
in turn shape patterns of behaviour (Jenson & Mérand 2010, pp.  85-6).  
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